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Fig. 1 Three sorts of value 
Introduction 
When Henk Meij delivered his valedictory lecture in this 
auditorium some four years ago, he prefaced his address by stating 
that when one hangs up one's toga, there is no longer any need for 
scientific profundity to prove one's point. I'm grateful to him for 
setting this precedent, because my address is about practice and not 
theory. While therefore not offering scientific proof today, I hope 
that what I have to say may be of interest to, and possibly even 
convince, some of you. 
A recurring issue here and elsewhere in Europe when value based 
management is discussed, is the question "May or should a business 
consider maximizing shareholdervalue its overriding objective?" 
With his recently published book, Hans van Londen hit the nail on 
the head by appropriately titling his publication Value or Values?. 
Selecting a value based metric as a superior proxy for 'profit' is one 
thing; the question as to what extent management has the moral 
right to dedicate the business to the sole purpose of making money 
to the exclusion of all other considerations, is quite another. This 
important issue is Van Londen's main concern. My concern today 
however is with value, i.e. applying value based metrics to the 
business, and not with values; however relevant this last issue is, 
may be, it is not my subject today. 
While limiting myself here to the question of value in the narrow 
sense, i.e. measurement, I would suggest that in practice, the 
management of any business in a free and thus competitive market 
has in fact to continuously try to maintain balance between three 
sorts of value: perceived customer value, stakeholder value, and 
shareholder value (howsoever measured), as depicted in figure 1. 
Needless to say, this balancing act is what management's ultimate 
task is really all about. 
Before touching on some practical aspects of value based manage-
ment and its implementation, I would like briefly to retrace my own 
'value journey' which took place over the ten years during which I 
was priviledged to teach Management Control to students of the 
postgraduate controllers program at this university. 
5 
Fig. 2 Eighteenth century water wheel 
2. Learning isn't linear 
My value journey to date seems to have been one of frequent stops 
and starts, like the turn of a water wheel whose water inflow has 
been reduced to a steady trickle: long periods of standing still until 
the bucket has filled up with water, followed by a quarter turn of the 
wheel, standstill again until the next bucket is full, then another 
quarter turn of the wheel, and so on. 
Getting to grips with the practical implications of value theory was 
consequently a jerky and lengthy process, rather than steady 
progress along a linear route. Being absorbed in detail, I occasion-
ally failed to recognize what should have been obvious at that 
moment. An example of my myopia was an assertion which I made 
in my inaugural lecture in September 1994 and which I am happy 
now to retract. 
\Assertion 
EVA does not provide a practical yardstick for entity valuation and 
consequently is not, as Stewart suggests, a multi-purpose metric 
suitable for use both as a measure of short term value realized and 
as a tool for estimating the net present value of entities or projects; 
\ a case of 'different measures for different purposes'. 
L 
Retraction 
Since accrual accounting profits and free cash flow converge in 
i11finity, it is in practice possible to use residual income, EPR or 
EVA (irrespective of whether accounting adjustlnents are nwde or 
not) as a multi-purpose metric to 1neasure both economic perfor-
mance and to perform entity valuations. By discounting future 
EP R 's the resultant net present value plus initial capital employed 
will equal the NPV of the corresponding discounted free cash flows. 
A working illustration is included in Appendix 1. Stewart was right! 
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Fig. 3 A personal VBM learning curve 
3. A personal VBM learning curve 
Cumulatively and in retrospect, the water wheel journey appears 
after all to have roughly resembled a parabola, recognizable as the 
experience, or learning curve, according to which each cumulative 
doubling of experience is supposed to lead to a 20% increase in 
effectiveness. 
It may be of comf01t to past students who grappled with 'value', 
and maybe relevant to future ones, to know that this learning curve 
was not smooth either, but actually went through four stages: 
discovery, confusion, doubt, and recovery. Having sometimes 
sensed my students passing through similar stages, I shall briefly 
sketch each one. 
Discovery 
Although I had read Rappaport in 1989, it was the prize-winning 
article on applying value in practice, by McKinsey's Wenner and 
LeBer: Managing for Shareholder Value front Top to Bottom (1990) 
which first really fired my interest in this area. Living in the USA 
at that time, I was able to visit the authors, who not only patiently 
answered my many beginner's questions but were good enough to 
present me with a copy of Tom Copeland's freshly published book 
Valuation. They also introduced me to Donald Weber, the CEO of 
Atlanta-based Contel Corporation, the company which their article 
described. Contel had just been through a value-based strategic 
review and Weber's enthusiasm for the underlying value 
applications sharpened my appetite for more. 
Stimulated by Valuation, still one of the best books I have read on 
the subject, I visited Copeland in New York with yet more begin-
ner's questions. He not only corrected some of my misconceptions 
but also coached and helped me to delve deeper into VBM, a field 
that was at that moment starting to attract growing interest in the 
US business community. During this discovery stage, 
I concentrated on getting to understand and apply the principles of 
value based strategic valuation. 
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Confusion 
Just as I thought I was beginning to master the subject of value 
based strategic valuation and its practical applications, Copeland 
recommended I read Stewart's The Quest for Value. This I 
accordingly did, and so began a period of confusion. 
This book expounds the ideas of Joel Stern, a New York consultant, 
alumnus of the University of Chicago and Stewart's senior partner. 
The central theme is that Economic Value Added, or EVA, is 
superior to all other value measures. EVA is arrived at by starting 
with residual income and reversing many accounting entries 
normally applied under accrual accounting principles, resulting in a 
quasi-cash flow metric net of capital cost. 
The author's rhetoric in acclaiming EVA's superiority over every 
other value metric failed to convince me. The myriad of accounting 
adjustments advocated by Stewart seemed to me impracticable and 
his attacks on accrual accounting overdone. Sidetracked as I was 
by all this detail, I overlooked what should have been obvious: if 
EVA including adjustments provided such a good value based 
metric, why should EVA without adjustments (i.e. residual income) 
be so terribly 'bad'? After all, value is a long term concept, so any 
short term measure is an approximation anyway. Moreover my 
focus was still mainly on valuation, while Stewart claimed to cover 
both valuation and performance measurement. 
Absorbed as I was by the issue of accounting adjustments, 
I also ignored the significance of Stewart's demonstration of the 
equivalence in infinity of EVA (and therefore, although not 
explicitely referred to by the author, also of residual income) and 
free cash flow. 
Finally, because I still had both eyes firmly fixed on the application 
of value to strategic valuation, I failed at the time to spot the fact 
that what the (US) business market was really interested in, was the 
application of value to performance measurement, a trend mirrored 
in Europe a year or so later. 
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Doubt 
Since the early 90's value had begun to become a relevant topic for 
local seminars, conferences, and a small but gradually growing 
number of publications, mainly in professional journals of 
accountancy and business economics. Most of these dealt with the 
broad principles of shareholder value or on how value could or 
should be measured, whether and why free cash flow was 
'superior' or not to accrual accounting profit, and so on, 
while implementing value was only rarely discussed. 
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the second half of the 90's, 
several local value try-outs had been or were being attempted. Few 
if any of these early initiatives proved really successful, and interest 
on the part of non-financial managers in seminars and conferences 
on the subject of value was waning judging by the falling number 
of participants. Consequently, I began to question my own 
preoccupation with the value theme. Was I perhaps overdoing it? 
Recovery 
Luckily there were sufficient others- including a gratifying number 
of my students - who kept the faith. Also, the stream of 
publications, both local and from abroad, continued to grow. 
Happily, some of these publications were starting to address more 
practical implementation issues, both on strategy deployment and 
on demystifying and simplifying some of the value measures on 
offer. McTaggart's The Value Imperative was an example of the 
first, and several publications by Lou Traas of the second. 
Speaking for myself, the real recovery began when I was engaged 
by Philips in the autumn of 1997 to develop a rollout program to 
introduce value based performance measurement and VBM 
throughout the organization. The performance measure selected by 
Philips was residual income, termed EPR (Economic Profit 
Realized), the addition of the R having been made at the suggestion 
of Traas. Since March 1998 the rollout is under way; to call it a 
learning experience would be an understatement. 
11 
By the end of this year the rollout should be complete. At this time 
all concerned are well into the next learning curve: removing 
implementation roadblocks. The water wheel's bucket is once again 
filling up! 
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4. Lessons learned 
Observing a number of VBM implementations, at times from close 
by, at times from a distance, I learned a number of lessons. 
Although largely common sense, and applicable to most projects 
involving major changes in management control, it has struck me 
how often precisely those so obvious do's and don'ts appear to have 
been overlooked or neglected. Here are five for which I make no 
claim for originality, but recommend they receive special attention. 
The CEO's ongoing involvement is essential 
Initial CEO commitment is of course a must, but is definitely not 
enough. The CEO's ongoing involvement is necessary in what will 
usually be an 18 to 24 months transformation process. There will 
be moments at which the transformation process falters, and 
roadblocks will emerge (see below). Without CEO involvement, 
particularly when problems arise, VBM deployment may lose 
steam and peter out altogether. I have seen this happen several 
times. 
Relevance is more important than precision when selecting 
value indicators 
Understandably, the CFO and financial staff will want to invest 
effort in selecting the most 'accurate' possible value indicator. 
lln fact simplicity and transparency should become the overriding 
criteria, since managers can only be expected to make use of the 
new indicators if these are readily understood, something which 
seems to have been largely overlooked in several local 
1!mplementations. Unsurprisingly, these failed to produce many 
significant changes in the way the operating managers in these 
companies made their everyday strategic decisions. 
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Managers need to identify their own value drivers 
At the heart of successful VBM deployment lies the application of 
improved leverage by operating managers of their business's 
-specific value drivers. These value drivers should include both 
financials as well as non-financials, and need to be identified for 
each business independently. If left to consultants or even the 
business's own financial staff, the identification of these drivers is 
not likely to lead to real 'ownership' by the operating managers of 
the business in question. Ownership is best achieved via discovery, 
so operating managers need to be directly involved in this 
discovery journey, which should be facilitated by the financial staff. 
Focus the VBM rollout on enhancing the everyday strategic 
decision process 
Introducing and explaining the new value indicators is an integral 
part of the rollout, but should not dominate it. Operating 
companies' strategies, as McTaggart pointed out, manifest 
themselves largely in day to day choices, i.e. trade-offs, between 
delivering customer value and economic (shareholder) value. 
These daily choices are seldom determined via singular insight 
from the top, even though the broad lines of the strategy may 
originate there. It is the sum of these everyday strategic choices 
which ultimately drives the quality and amount of value creation. 
Consequently, the VBM rollout should accord much attention to 
these everyday strategic choices, and in particular the mindsets of 
the operating managers making these decisions. 
Expect 'roadblocks'; they can be removed 
Accountability for results is central to successful VBM 
deployment. Where accountability is blurred, the VBM 
implementation process will mercilessly highlight such anomalies. 
Removing these may not be easy, particularly if internal politics 
stand in the way. Without senior or top management's involvement, 
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such roadblocks may persist, limiting the effectiveness of the value 
based approach. 
Anticipate a major roadblock (which can be taken care of in 
advance of VBM deployment) when the intention is to couple the 
introduction of VBM to changes in existing executive bonus plans. 
Such adjustments involve many more issues than initially meet the 
eye and really require careful attention by a senior level group, 
including representatives of finance, HRM and - in my opinion 
crucially - the CEO or a very experienced and senior non-financial 
line manager. An example of ten typical bonus plan-related issues 
to be considered - and there are many more - is included in 
Appendix 2. 
Aside from these two major roadblocks, business-specific road-
blocks may be expected, often related to additional insights and 
information required to support VBM at operating levels. 
The VBM rollout process can be used to identify these. 
The necessary diagnosis can best be performed by the operating 
managers themselves with the help of a scanning aid. Appendix 3 
illustrates an example used in a recent VBM introduction. 
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5. Measuring value with Keynes in mind 
"It's better to be approxilnately right than precisely wrong" 
John Maynard Keynes. 
Why choose complex or arcane indicators? 
Value is realized only when profits exceed capital costs. 
By measuring the monetary spread (rather than just the percentage 
as ROI does) between profit and capital costs, the amount of value 
realized or destroyed in a particular period can be determined. This 
spread is simple to calculate, is easy for managers to understand, 
and is not new (it was first introduced in the 50's by General 
Electric to assess divisional performance; they coined it residual 
income). 
Not being new turns out to have its disadvantages, witness the 
considerable publicity accorded in the last decade to more complex 
value based indicators such as SVA, CVA, CFROI, TSR and EVA, 
each claimed by its supporters to provide a better measure of value 
,than residual income. The claims for each of these measures by 
their respective proponents may differ on detail but usually include 
~three propositions: 
1. Most claim to avoid the alledged shortcomings of accrual 
accounting by substituting either cash flow or quasi cash flow for 
accounting profit, frequently drawing on the proposition that 
'profit is an opinion, while cash flow is a fact'. 
2. Some claim to deliver a single metric which can be applied to 
measuring both short term and total value created. 
3. Several claim to provide a better-than-the-rest proxy for long 
term share price trends. 
The closer these claims are examined, the less convincing they 
seem. Consider briefly the following. 
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'Cashflow is a fact' 
.-Of course this is so, but as Traas points out, it is equally a fact that 
yearly free cash flow does not provide management with an 
indicator of the year's economic performance, i.e. the return over or 
under capital cost. This being so, the all-important question which 
remains is: which - if any - adjustments to accounting profit are 
needed to obtain an 'accurate' measure of 'return' and 'capital 
employed' during a single period? The truth is that it is precisely the 
answer to this question which is and will remain a matter of 
opinion, notwithstanding what the proponents of various 
proprietary metrics may argue. 
Single measure for short and long term 
;Since total accounting profit and the corresponding total cash flow 
equal each other in infinity, it follows that any metric howsoever 
calculated which is derived from accrual accounting will meet this 
condition of equivalence. Bear in mind also, that future value can 
only be estimated, so that the term measuring is not really 
appropriate at all, the more so as the usually dominant continuing 
(or terminal) value is no more than an educated guess, whichever 
Jormula is applied to calculating it. 
Superior proxy for long-term share trends 
Several supporters of various metrics contend, and offer statistical 
evidence to back up their claims, that their value metrics represent 
better proxies of long term share price trends than all competing 
metrics. These claims frequently contradict each other, so who 
should we really believe? Interestingly, recent research by a group 
of academics (Biddle c.s., 1997) even suggests that net earnings 
before exceptional items (EBEI) actually beats residual income, 
EVA and cash flow as proxy for explaining share price movement 
over a recent 5-year period! (See Appendix 4) 
Nevertheless, cash flow-converts abound and the promoters of cash 
flow-based value measures claim a growing number of users both 
in the USA, UK, and - in the last few years - continental Europe. 
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The most widely propagated performance indicator is Stern 
Stewart's quasi cash flow EVA, whose promoters advance a total of 
164 accounting adjustments, but concede that a far smaller number 
of adjustments, say four or five, may also do "if less accuracy is 
acceptable". Was it this that prompted a speaker at a recent US 
conference on accounting to remark that Stern Stewart "are 
accountants introducing their own accruals"? Or to put it another 
way, isn't EVA simply Stern Stewart's opinion? 
Residual income, the parent out of which EVA was concocted, can 
be adjusted for specific accrual items (e.g. goodwill) if such items 
are considered by users to distort the picture of the business's 
performance. An adjustment to capital employed to reflect the real 
value of fixed assets can also be considered. Beyond these two, 
relevance and recognizability need to have priority over so-called 
precision. 
!While annual or forecasted free cash flow certainly provides 
management with essential information, annual free cash flow is 
not a proxy for yearly value realized or destroyed, and I remain 
sceptical as to whether petformance indicators derived from cash 
flow really provide a better proxy for yearly value realized than 
accounting-based residual income. In my experience residual 
income is easier for managers to understand than yearly 
performance indicators derived from cash flow, the more so as their 
dashboard anyhow will continue to include conventional cash flow 
information (though not for measuring economic performance!) 
':and accounting profit data. 
Therefore, whatever the perceived intrinsic merits or demerits of 
the one value indicator over the other, I would argue in favour of 
recognisability and simplicity rather than intellectual elegance, 
since the most important thing of all is that operating managers 
must be able to recognize and understand(!) the new metric, as 
otherwise they won't readily understand it and thus won't use the 
new metric. Remember Keynes! 
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6. Fatal Attraction 
Measurement methods or management mindset? 
Mention value based management to a financial manager and the 
odds are that the ensuing discussion will be about how best to 
measure value based performance: the respective merits and 
demerits of indicators such as EVA, SVA, CFROI etc., the pro's and 
cons of various accounting adjustments, how best to account for 
goodwill, and so on. Relevant (and professionally satisfying!) as 
these questions may be, too much attention for the value metric can 
prove a fatal attraction, distracting the effort from the ultimate task, 
which is actively supporting the creation of a 'value mindset' at all 
management levels. 
Having once made this mistake myself, I can testify to the danger 
of the fatal attraction. Happily in my case, two colleagues 
recognized my error, and helped the project back on track in time. 
Others have however been less lucky; neglecting or 
underestimating the critical importance of changing management's 
mindset, their VBM projects have either vaporised or degenerated 
into a more or less sterile numbers exercise, with little or no impact 
on the everyday strategic decision process. 
Examples of value based mindset 
'Mindset' is about how one looks at things, and consequently 
partly a matter of individual preferences and perceptions; we tend 
to see the most clearly that which is recognizable, and puzzle at or 
overlook that which is not. Concrete examples of mindset 
therefore tend to be personal. Here are some examples of value 
based mindset which I have found very useful in practice. 
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A business can destroy value even though it is profitable 
If profits are insufficient to cover capital costs, value is destroyed 
notwithstanding a positive bottom line. This can be the result of 
overinvestment, excessive working capital requirements, 
inadequate operating margins, inefficient financing, or a 
combination of several of these. Longer term value destruction is a 
typical symptom of flawed strategies, or poor execution of these. 
Financial problents are usually strategic problems in disguise 
Value destruction can result from striving for expansion in 
marginally attractive markets, or starting from a disadvantaged 
competitive position, or a combination of these. Applying a 
financial tourniquet may limit the damage, but only a major 
change in strategy can lead to sustainable value creation. 
The vital difference between 'good' growth and 'bad' growth 
'Good' growth occurs when expanding a business or activity whose 
operating profit exceeds its capital costs. 'Bad' growth is the result 
of expanding activities which, although profitable, regularly fail to 
cover their capital costs. In such cases, even though operating 
profits grow with expansion, growth will actually magnify the 
amount of value destruction taking place! Shrinking the activity 
- if this is possible - will probably reduce the value destruction. 
Long term value creation is more important than short term value 
improvement 
Sustainable year on year improvement of value realized counts for 
more than spectacular one-off improvements. Losing sight of this 
can pose a real threat to the business's continuity and open the door 
to longer term value destruction. 
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A suitable value based 1netric is more than just a performance indi-
cator 
A suitable metric provides a monetary platform for developing 
value based strategies, recognizing that in any business there are 
only three ways of creating economic value: 
'OPERATE' or fine-tune i.e. improve inadequate returns 
earned on existing capital employed, without undertaking 
major additional investments 
'BUILD' i.e. expand and invest in activities whose returns 
exceed capital costs 
'HARVEST' i.e. divest or scale down activities whose 
returns are inadequate to cover capital costs, and redeploy 
capital thus released into activities or businesses whose 
returns exceed capital costs. 
None of these mindsets are 'new' or particularly earth shaking, and 
when presented to, and discussed with, operating managers, these 
mindsets are usually greeted as sound and both-feet-on-the-ground 
common sense. Be that as it may, applying these mindsets 
vigorously is tougher than talking about them. Once they become 
part and parcel of a manager's intuition, these and similar mindsets 
start to impact everyday strategic decisions. That, essentially is 
what value based management should be about. 
I hope that I have convinced you that when introducing VBM, the 
first priority is communicating with operating managers about its 
application to everyday strategic decisions. Of course a suitable 
value metric has to be selected and communicated. But don't allow 
1this to dominate the project. And whether you are a CEO, a CFO, 
or a financial manager, make sure that neither the company, you, or 
your colleagues become the victims of Fatal Attraction! 
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7. Will VBM make it to 2005? 
The ebb and flow of business fads 
Every time I step into a bookshop or open my mail, I'm surprised 
by the flood of new publications about management methods and 
tools, and start to worry that I may be missing out on something 
important. Fortunately, many new ideas turn out to be either com-
mon sense revisited or the preoccupation of specialists seeking to 
demonstrate (sometimes successfully) the validity of their con-
cepts. Today's business world being as complicated as it is, it is 
hardly surprising that the average company's pipeline contains 
something like 15 nascent management tools and techniques, the 
majority being replaced or discarded within a few years. Pascale's 
drawing (see fig. 4), dating from 1992, titled The Ebb and Flow of 
Business fads speaks for itself. So the question is: "Will value based 
management make it to 2005 or is it yet another business fad?". 
Functionality, simplicity and transparency 
An acid test to help separate durable management tools and 
concepts from mere fads is to ask three questions: 
does it meet a real management need? (functionality) 
is it simple to apply? (simplicity) 
will management understand it? (transparency). 
Does value based management pass this test? 
Functionality 
It is (;l simple precondition, first formulated by Adam Smith, that in 
a free market any business employing capital will need to earn 
returns which exceed its capital costs if the business is to grow and 
prosper. That management needs to track whether this financial 
precondition is being met, is therefore axiomatic for all businesses 
where 'capital employed' is positive. Thanks to Modigliani and 
Miller, a theoretical model, CAPM, is available, providing us with 
a rough proxy of the cost of risk adjusted equity enabling us to 
25 
estimate - if not determine precisely - how much that capital cost is. 
A value based approach simply recognizes Adam Smith's financial 
precondition and makes use of CAPM to assist and support 
managers to steer a strategic/financial path within the boundaries of 
that financial precondition. Until someone develops a better way to 
provide this support, VBM's functionality would seem to me to be 
beyond serious doubt. 
Simplicity 
Managers have to keep both eyes on the road and consequently 
must be able to read their dashboard indicators at a glance. 
Knowing whether value is being realized or not is 'need to know' 
information; exactly how 1nuch, while relevant in the longer run, is 
less important on an everyday basis. A value based mindset is, as I 
hope has become evident, no more than applied common sense. 
By combining it with an uncomplicated dashboard indicator, the 
criterion of simplicity is met. 
Transparency 
The complexity of a dashboard indicator is inversely proportional 
to the management attention it gets. We all recognize that which we 
_understand, and operating managers are no exception. They are not 
1 paid to deal with accounting complexities, and cannot be expected 
to invest the time necessary to master financial abstractions. The 
logic behind a simple value based indicator must be transparent 
enough to retain managements attention; relevance, and not 
Lprecision, is the key to meeting the criterion of transparency. 
Will value based management make it to 2005? 
As already indicated, the underlying principles of value based 
management are not new at all: ROI dates back to the 20's and even 
the original monetary indicator, residual income, is some 40 years 
old. More recent perhaps is the revival of awareness amongst 
senior managers of the relevance of 'value' to their strategies, and 
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the notion that by including a value indicator on management's 
dashboard the business's everyday strategic decision processes will 
receive improved support. 
But the real point is not whether VBM is yesterday's meal warmed 
up and repackaged or whether it's new. The question is: will it last? 
I think that value applications which fail the 'acid test' of functio-
nality, simplicity and transparency will in the longer run have diffi-
culty in living up to the claims put up for them, and will be discar-
ded by companies whose initial high hopes are not 
realized. In retrospect, these applications will join Pascale's list of 
business fads. 
This will not be the case for value applications which successfully 
pass the 'acid test ' of functionality, simplicity and transparency. 
The intrinsic truth and relevance of the simple statement value is 
only created when returns exceed capital cost is so undeniable that 
I, at any rate, believe that value based management - under the 
proviso's I have mentioned- can and will be successfully deployed 
in a growing number of European companies. If not forever, than 
certainly until and beyond 2005. 
Ik heb gezegd. 
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Appendix 1 Demonstration of equivalence of NPV s of Free Cash Flow and EPR 
Date 01-01-98 31-12-98 31-12-99 31-12-00 31-12-01 
Period (project currency = NLG 0 1 2 3 4 CV 
IFO not appl. 30 60 90 100 90 
% tax (effective country tax rate) not appl. 0% 25% 25% 50% 50% 
NO PAT not appl. 30 45 68 50 45 
Depreciation not appl. 40 50 40 30 10 
Change in Working Capital (50) (20) 10 10 
Changes in Provisions 20 
N Cash Flow from Operating Activities (50) 70 95 118 90 55 00 
Capital Expenditures (400) (50) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
Grants/subsidies (after tax) 25 15 
Continuing Value (after tax) not appl. not appl. not appl. not appl. not appl. 600 
Free Cash Flow (425) 20 85 108 80 600 
Discount factor (WACC = 10%) 1.000 0.9091 0.8264 0.7513 0.6830 0.6830 
NPV of Free Cash Flow (425) 18 70 81 55 410 
Cumulative NPV(FCF) (425) (407) (337) (256) (201) 209 
I 
NPV of Project 
I [][] ~ 209 0 1 
Source: Royal Philips Electronics NV, reproduced by permission( continued on next page) 
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Appendix 1 Demonstration of equivalence of NPV s of Free Cash Flow and EPR (continued) 
Period 0 1 2 3 4 CV 
NO PAT not appl. 30 45 68 50 45 
Capital 450 460 420 380 350 
Return on invested Capital (ROIC) 6.7% 9.8% 16.1% 13.2% 12.9% 
EPR spread(= ROIC- WACC) -3.3% -0.2% 6.1% 3.2% 2.9% 
Grants/subsidies (after tax) 25 15 
Continuing Value 250 
N 
\0 EPR (incl. grants/subsidies) 25 (15) (1) 26 12 250 
Discount factor (WACC = 10%) 1.000 0.9091 0.8264 0.7513 0.6830 0.6830 
NPV (EPRs) 25.0 -13.6 -0.8 19.2 8.2 170.8 
Cumulative NPV (EfR) 25 11 11 30 38 209 
1
- NPV of Project I 
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Source: Royal Philips Electronics NV, reproduced by permission 
Appendix 2 Implementing VBM bonus plans 
Ten questions on value based executive compensation plan 
1. Status quo financial performance-related bonus programs 
What are the current programs, are they formula-driven, and will 
they be replaced or augmented by the value based bonus plan? 
2. Envisaged value based bonus program 
What are your company's intentions in regard to the following: 
- bonus to be target (i.e. budge/SP) based or not? 
- bonus to be capped or uncapped? 
- bonus based on uniform pay/performance for all divisions 
or risk-adjusted per division? 
- bonus based on single year performance or multi-year or 
combination? 
3. Envisaged impact of mix of selected bonus criteria 
What is the approximate intended mix? 
Value related 
Other financials-related 
Non-financials-related 
Total 
single year mult-year 
4. Accountability for unit performance after job transfer 
total 
100% 
Will managers retain responsibility and be bonussable for unit 
results during a limited period after they have been transferred to 
another unit? 
5. Existing stock option plans 
Will these be integrated in all or part with the value based bonus 
program? 
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Appendix 2 Implementing VBM bonus plans (continues) 
6. Interaction between accountability levels within divisions 
What is the level of interaction between accountability levels 
within individual divisions? What are the perceived benefits of 
having a portion of the bonus determined by value-based 
performance of the unit one level above the one for which a 
manager is directly accountable? 
7. Impact periodic adjustments of WACC 
(How) will value-related bonus levels be affected if WACCs are 
adjusted from time to time? In particular how would this affect 
the bonus portion based on multi-year value based performance? 
8. Launch date and rollout communication program 
What is the launch date, how will the program be communicated, 
and is there a companywide rollout plan including 
communication plan, help desk, and supporting software or other 
standardized calculation models? 
9. 'Big Bang' or step-by-step implementation? 
Has consideration been given to the possibility of implementing 
the value based bonus program in stages (e.g. over 2-3 year 
period) or is the Big Bang approach preferred? 
lO.Availability draft plan 
Is a draft plan of the value based bonus program available at this 
stage? 
31 
32 
r 
(.).) 
(.).) 
Appendix 3 Example of diagnostic Scan for VBM operational roadblocks 
VBM deployment includes anticipating and duly 
removing 'roadblocks' 
Roadblocks can be expected 0 0 0 and successfully overcome 0 0 0 
~ 
• 
~ 
* * 
~ ~ 
w 
+::-
Appendix 3 Example of diagnostic Scan for VBM operational roadblocks (continued) 
Some examples of frequently encountered roadblocks 
To assess the statu~uo in your BU/business area, please 
enterlj_J in the appropriate box 
Roadblock 
Insufficient consensus on precise 
nature of business's Critical Success 
Factors (external and int~al) 
Managers not yet familiar with using 
EPR 
Insufficient insight into the 
business's non-financial value 
drivers and/or their relationship to 
the financial value drivers 
Removing the roadblock 
Involve managers in Quick Scan 
focusing on strengthening under-
standing of business's current Critical 
Success Factors and expected 
major competitive and other external 
changes 
Hands-on exercises in scenario-
building/sensitivity tests, using 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
DASHBOARD 2.0 
Organise workshops in which 
managers identify the business's non-
financial value drivers and 
establish linkages with the financial 
value drivers 
~ 
Appendix 3 Example of diagnostic Scan for VBM operational roadblocks (continued) 
Some examples of frequently encountered roadblocks (cont.) 
To assess the status quo in your BU/business area, please 
enterffi in the appropriate box 
Roadblock 
No or insufficient info available on 
approximate EPR per Line of 
Business (LOB), product(lines) or 
~ main clients/market segments 
The business portfolio has not . yet 
been redefined in Value terms, 
combining strategic positioning with 
EPR data per LOB, product(line) and 
main clients or market segments 
. Some of the BU's products are part of 
cross-boundary value chains 
involving other BU's, but there is no 
or insufficient insight into the value 
chain's total EPR 
Removing the roadblock 
Involve managers in quick scan using 
activity-based costing to determine 
or verify EPR per LOB, 
product (lines), main clients /market 
segments,etc 
Involve managers in Strategic 
Positioning Assessment (SPA) 
exercise including EPR Waterfall 
charts and final positioning on 
Bubble charts 
Arrange a Total Value check, a 
rudimentary internal analysis of the 
BU's cross-boundary value chain, in 
cases where inter-BU product trans-
fers take place on a significant scale 
w 
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Appendix 3 Example of diagnostic Scan for VBM operational roadblocks (continued) 
Please complete this "spiderweb-diagram" by plotting the status of each of the 6 items you 
assessed on sheets 5 and 6 in the diagram below. Thereafter please join the points plotted, 
creating a "spiderweb",providing a quick overview of which roadblocks need to be removed 
Insight into 
value chain's 
totalEPR 
Portfolio 5 
defined in 
value terms 
Critical Success 
Factors known 
1 
Availability info on EPR per 
LOB/product/segment/client etc. 
Managers 
familiar with 
EPR 
Insight into 
non-financial 
value drivers 
I 
~ 
I..N 
-......) 
Appendix 3 Example of diagnostic Scan for VBM operational roadblocks (continued) 
Steps to removing VBM roadblocks own BU/Business area 
Experience suggests that a step-by-step approach will give better results than a head-on frontal 
assault ... 
Suggested steps: 
111111 Invite and collect initiatives/suggestions from all MT-members 
111111 Discuss and review all proposals; most will (and should be) based on setting up 
internal workshops (objective: combining 'discovery'+ 'ownership') 
111111 Prioritize workshop projects; if possible, try to pick the low-hanging fruit first, 
thus leveraging own success and boosting internal motivation 
111111 Designate a champion per project and assure that he has access to necessary 
resources to prepare and facilitate the workshops and/or other supporting events 
111111 Assess each project ex-post: has the roadblock truly been removed? 
Appendix 4 Extract from Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, volume 24:3, December 1997 
Does EVA beat earnings? 
Evidence on associations with stock returns and firm values 
Gary C. Biddle, Robert M. Bowen, James S. Wallace 
School of Business Administration, University of Washington, 
Seattle, WA 98195-3200, USA School of Business and 
Management, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, 
Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China, Graduate School of 
Management, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-3125, 
USA 
Abstract 
This study tests assertions that Economic Value Added (EVA®) is 
more highly associated with stock returns and firm values than 
accrual earnings, and evaluates which components of EVA, if any, 
contribute to these associations. Relative information content tests 
reveal earnings to be more highly associated with returns and firm 
values than EVA, residual income, or cash flow from operations. 
Incremental tests suggest that EVA components add only 
marginally to information content beyond earnings. Considered 
together, these results do not support claims that EVA dominates 
earnings in relative information content, and suggest rather that ear-
nings generally outperforms EVA. 
Summary and potential limitations 
Motivated by increased use in practice and increased interest in the 
media and among academics, we examine the value-relevance of 
EVA and residual income\ compared to currently-mandated 
'performance measures - earnings and cash flow from operations? 
There is little evidence to support the Stern Stew art claim that EVA 
is superior to earnings in its association with stock returns or firm 
values. In no case does EVA significantly outperform EBEI in tests 
of relative information content. On the contrary, in most cases the 
38 
evidence suggests that earnings outperforms EV A. Further, while 
the charge for capital and Stern Stewart's adjustments for 
accounting "distortions" show some marginal evidence of being 
incrementally important, this difference does not appear to be 
economically significant. Possible reasons why we do not detect 
stronger value-relevance for EVAiriclude: 
Our research design uses current realizations, not future flows, of 
• each performance measure. Equity valuation is ultimately the 
discounted present value of future equity cash flows (or 
dividends or RI or EVA). Even if EVA is a good proxy for 
economic profits, realized EVA may not outperform the current 
realizations of other performance measures such as earnings in 
proxying for future equity cash flows. This is similar to the 
rationale used to explain why EBEI generally outperforms CFO 
in relative information 
content. 
Stern Stewart's estimates of the charge for capital and accounting 
• adjustments may contain measurement error relative to what the 
market is using to value firms. Further, we use Stern Stewart's 
publicly available database which does not include many custom 
adjustments they use for their clients. 
There exists little or no "surprise value" in components unique to 
e EVA including the capital charge and Stern Stewart's accounting 
adjustments. For example, if the cost of capital and the amount of 
capital are slow to change (or the changes are predictable months 
or years in advance), the market should long ago have 
impounded these data. However, over five-year return intervals, 
theopportunity for surprise should be larger, and results reported 
in section 5. 3 do not lend support for the superiority of EVA over 
this longer return interval. 
Data needed to compute EVA are not easily estimated and the 
e market does not have these data during our test period. Recall 
that we assume that the market has access to sufficient data 
within 3 months of a firm's fiscal year end such that EVA (and its 
components) can be reliably estimated by that time. 
his potential issue is mitigated in tests that use alternative 
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notes: 
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